for those who did not want
to be involved in either of
the blocks, there was an
attempt to create one. The
core concerns of people,
especially those who were
recently de-colonised,
like poverty, disease,
inequality and colonialism
were not addressed by any
of these issues of
contention.
The leaders of newly
independent nations felt
the need for a change from
the insecure and tense
situation. So, in 1955, a conference was held at Bandung in Indonesia. It was the
first Asio-African conference represented by 29 nations. The most important
leaders of this conference were Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Prime Minister
of India, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the leader of Egypt and Josip Broz Tito, the leader
of Yugoslavia. Pt. Nehru was acknowledged as the chief spokesperson. It paved
the way for Non Aligned Movement (NAM).
Thus, non-alignment was established as an international organisation with an
aim to promote cultural and economic cooperation among the newly independent
countries of Asia, Africa and later Latin America.
The first Summit was held at Belgrade in Yugoslavia in September 1961. It
was attended by 25 member countries. By 2012, the membership has grown to
120 countries with 17 Observers. The first Summit was the culmination of three
major concerns
- Cooperation among the member nations of NAM, most of them had newly
emerged as free countries.
- Growing Cold War tensions and its impact on the world at large.
- To prevent any of the newly decolonised independent countries from joining
any of the military blocks.
Over the years, the NAM helped countries like India to take an independent
position when the two super powers fell apart and pulled countries to their side. It
also helped the newly emerging countries to bargain for space and assistance from
the super powers by playing one against the other. To some extent, it also helped
to ease tensions amongst the NAM countries. Even though both the blocks looked
at NAM with suspicion, the US regarded the NAM as being closer to the USSR on
wider international issues. Its inaction in the case of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
pg no 282
